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Let’s start with three recent maritime lethal incidents at the gates of the European 
Union. 
1. On 29 March 2012, the Dutch Senator and law scholar Tineke Strik 
presented the report entitled Lives lost in the Mediterranean: Who is 
responsible?2 on behalf of the Council of Europe. The document 
reported about what could be labeled a conscious non-rescue of a boat 
with migrants that had left Tripoli one year before, on 26 March 2011, 
for the Italian island of Lampedusa. Seventy-two refugees travelled in 
the boat. After two weeks adrift, the waves returned the boat to the 
coast of Libya with only 11 survivors on board. Two of them died in 
the following days. 
                                                
1  Published under Creative Commons licence: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 
2 “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible?” Report. Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Displaced Persons. Rapporteur: Ms Tineke STRIK, Netherlands, Socialist Group    
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329_mig_RPT.EN.pdf (accessed 11/04/2012) 
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Strik's story is compelling. She argued that the tragedy could have been 
avoided had not a chain of errors been made by respectively the Libyan 
authorities, the Centers for Maritime Rescue Coordination from Italy 
and Malta, and NATO. The incident took place during the military 
intervention of NATO in Libya. The report particularly criticized the 
lack of aid of two NATO vessels which were close to the boat carrying 
the refugees and who could have saved them from dying, but did not.  
2. On March 11th 2013,  one year after the aforementioned report was 
presented, public attention was drawn to another lethal incident that 
occurred at the maritime gates of the EU.  This time, a video with 
images recorded by the cameras of the Integrated System of External 
Surveillance (SIVE) at the coast of Lanzarote was leaked to the media, 
revealing how a Guardia Civil patrol boat named "Rio Cabaleiro" 
collided with a small boat (patera) carrying 25 Moroccan youngsters3. 
The collision, which had taken place on 13 December 2012, made the 
patera shipwreck. Seventeen of the 25 passengers survived. Six people 
were lost at sea. Only one corpse was recovered. Three of the survivors 
remained in the Canary Islands. The rest were repatriated to Morocco. 
After being leaked to the media, the images captured by the SIVE’s 
surveillance cameras circulated widely. They served to publically 
monitor the performance of those in charge of the securitization of the 
Spanish EU external border segment. Many hours of bordering have 
been filmed since 2002, when the first sensors, radars and cameras of 
the SIVE were installed in Algeciras, Spain. But this was the first time 
that the collected visual material was not used to detect and block the 
arrival of immigrants. It was instead used to watch the watchers. It 
served to monitor some of those in charge of EU external border 
control.  
The leaked recording, about 4 minutes long, is revealing. First, it shows 
how the Civil Guard patrol boat hits the patera and how it makes it 
sink. And second, because it shows that the official version provided by 
the Spanish authorities immediately after the incident does not 
correspond to what the leaked images show. The facts are currently 
being investigated by the judge of the court number 3 of Arrecife 
(Lanzarote). It might take a while though before we see how Spanish 
justice settles responsibilities. 
 
                                                
3http://www.cadenaser.com/sociedad/video/video-desmonta-version-oficial-choque-
lanzarote/csrcsrpor/20130311csrcsrsoc_1/Ves (accessed 1/04/2012) 
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3. On October 3rd 2013 a boat full of immigrants capsized in front of the 
island of Lampedusa. More than 300 people died. The death toll is 
shuddering. But it is even more shuddering to think that it is only a 
small percentage of the total amount of migrants who died at the gates 
of the EU over the last two decades. 
On this occasion, the unusual accumulation of victims in the same 
accident, linked to the vergogna (shame) Pope Francis talked about, 
lead to a heavy media attention, compared to similar incidents in the 
past.  
Deadly cat-and mouse game 
These three tragic events occurred at the maritime gates of the EU are by no 
means exceptional. On the contrary, they are exemplary of the accountability battle 
around the current harsh management regime of human mobility to the European 
Union. Since the opening of the internal borders of the EU and the rapidly 
increasing fencing off and militarizing of its external borders, the coasts of the EU 
have become a death trap and a mass grave for refugees and irregular immigrants 
heading north. The EU external border is now the deadliest border on earth. In 
somewhat less than ten years, since the opening of the internal borders in the EU in 
1993, it is estimated that at least 20.000 people have died4. And this figure only 
counts the deaths that were actually found. The Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic 
Ocean have become a grave for probably many more bodies. In fact, over the last 
years, as the EU’s rhetoric of proximity and support vis-a-vis a southern shore in 
geopolitical turmoil grew5, the number of migrants from Africa who died on the 
shores of the EU even reached a dramatic all-time peak. According to a report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees6, more than 1,500 immigrants 
died in the Mediterranean in 2011.  
In a continuous effort to escape the border controls of the EU, over the years, 
irregular migratory flows have shifted geographically. Ceuta and Melilla, the 
Canary Islands, Lampedusa, Greek Islands and the Evros River have now become 
hot spots in the self-acclaimed battle against undocumented travellers.  Greece is 
now the main entry point for irregular migratory flows into the EU, while Turkey 
has become the main country of transit. As a response, a new wall has been built 
between the two countries to further fortify the EU outer contour.  
                                                
4 http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/ (accessed 20/10/2013) 
5 Shown in EC communications like the one on Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean on 8 March 2011, see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/268, or in the SPRING Programme, lunched on 
27 September 2011, see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/636&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 11/04/2012) 
6 http://www.unhcr.org/4f27e01f9.html  (accessed 11/04/2012) 
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In this context, the first week of August 2012, the Greek government 
launched Operation Xenios Zeus. In the context of the operation more than 7,500 
irregular immigrants were arrested. The Hellenic Minister of Public Order, Nikos 
Dendias, said that the objective of the manoeuvre was to fight what he called a 
"historical invasion." What happened showed the impetus with which the 
xenophobic overdose injected by neo-fascist party Golden Dawn currently flows 
through the veins of Greek politics. Eighteen seats occupied by fascists in the new 
parliament are currently putting a heavy burden on the actions and mindset of the 
government of Athens (Ferrer-Gallardo and Van Houtum, 2012). 
Blaming the neighbours 
The abovementioned report of the Council of Europe presented by Tineke 
Strik also makes clear that the Arab Spring (see Zapata-Barrero and Ferrer-
Gallardo, 2012; Bialasiewicz, 2011; Echagüe et al., 2011) principally has not 
changed the border regime either. The collateral damage politics towards the 
migrants extended towards damaging the relations with the neighours. The EU is 
showing a forked tongue vis-à-vis its north-African neighbours. One the one hand, 
there is an idealistic rhetoric of geopolitical and geo-economic approach to non-
candidate neighbors, mediated via the European Neighbourhood Policy (see Ferrer-
Gallardo and Kramsch, 2012; Bicchi, 2011; Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011).  
After the outbreak of the Arab spring, the EU continued adding layers to its 
discursive palimpsest of assemblage vis-a-vis the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean: New and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy7, Partnership 
for Democracy and Prosperity Shared with the southern Mediterranean.8 The 
EUalso reshaped its Global Approach to Migration9, emphasizing the need to 
encourage certain forms of mobility through its external borders. On the other 
hand, this was however coupled and succeeded time and again with this harsh and 
discriminatory realpolitik of border remarking and the obstruction of free mobility 
to the vast majority of citizens of neighboring countries. What is more, over the last 
years, the neighbours and the neighbours of these neighbours are increasingly 
(ab)used to contribute to the securitization desires of the EU. The border 
cooperation with third countries – through whose territory irregular immigration 
routes run or from where they depart – develops in exchange for money and a more 
fluid bilateral relationship.  
Increasingly, the stopping of unwanted migration now has started in origin 
countries by means of visa policies and deterrence campaigns (see Vaughan-
Williams, 2008; Neal, 2009; López-Sala and Esteban-Sánchez, 2010; Van Houtum, 
2010). Frontex’s activities entail, for example, the deployment of European border 
                                                
7 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-643_en.htm (accessed 11/04/2012) 
8 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-268_en.htm (accessed 11/04/2012) 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/1_EN_ACT_part1_v9.pdf  (accessed 11/04/2012) 
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patrols in the territory of third countries. The EU border regime is therefore not 
only projected onto the spatial confines of the EU. It also crystallizes in the 
agreements on development cooperation signed between the EU and third 
countries, in biometric databases, or in immigration detention centers located both 
inside and outside the EU. The relocation of border control tasks has clearly 
increased the diffuse, volatile and scattered profile (Balibar, 2004, 125) of the EU 
external border. 
The legal and moral outsourcing of migration and border control by the EU 
has transformed countries like Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania in 
a sort of cordon sanitaire of contention against the arrival of illegal immigration 
(Casas et al., 2011; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011; López Sala and Esteban Sánchez, 
2010; Wunderlich, 2010, De Haas, 2008). Gradually, these new practices of 
immigration control and border management have been forming an archipelago-
like cartography of "waiting areas" for immigrants and refugees. And, as year after 
year organizations like Migreurop or the Human Rights Association of Andalusia 
and denounce actions like Tribunal 1210 underline, at these new territorial and legal 
confines of the EU, respect for fundamental rights of migrants is not assured.  
Collateral damage politics 
Deaths at the external EU border have not gone unnoticed. But what is 
striking, is that by many observers, left and right, this dying is still seen as the 
“collateral damage” of the EU defending its own wealth and comfort. The EU sees 
no direct responsibility for itself. But we would argue here that the wasting of 
human lives in the seawaters at the doorsteps of the EU is anything but collateral. 
To answer the question of Strik’s report Lives lost in the Mediterranean: Who is 
responsible?, we would argue that the EU border regime should be held 
responsible. The dying of migrants is consubstantial. The most important reason for 
this argument is that principally and strategically at the gates of the EU a moral 
distinction between the value of human beings is made (Van Houtum and 
Boedeltje, 2009).  The lives of EU-citizens are valued differently than the lives of 
those who come irregularly by boats and wish to become part of the EU. This 
discrimination is not collateral but part and parcel of the border policy itself. Based 
on a negative and positive Schengen list, migrants born in and coming from poor 
countries (negative list, containing 135 states) are often denied access whereas 
migrants born in and coming from ‘Western’ or developed countries (positive list, 
containing 60 states) are usually heartily welcomed (Van Houtum, 2010). The 
consequence of this discriminatory regime based on the lottery of birth is that with 
the continuous demand for cheap labour in the EU, the migrants are sentenced to 
travel via the illegal and often deathly routes (see Tsianos et al., 2008). As Doty 
(2011, 2) notes, looking at the US-Mexico context, migrants who are wanted for 
                                                
10See:http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/En_los_confines_de_Europa_Migreurop_2011.pdf  , 
http://www.apdha.org/media/FronteraSur2012.pdf  and http://tribunal12.org/ (accessed 11/04/2012) 
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their labour but unwanted as human beings “are perfect candidates for being 
reduced to bare life”. These deaths are seen as the bodies of the nobodies or what 
Zygmunt Bauman called lives that are implicitly perceived as waste (Bauman, 
2004).  
The regime of EU outer bordering has become trapped in a logic of 
increasing investments without addressing or solving the underlying problem. It is 
on a mission impossible. Migrants will still come, no matter how high the fence is. 
But because of the increasing difficulty to get in legally, they are provoked to seek 
their entrances irregularly. Leading only to more phobia and criminalisation, which 
then is answered by yet higher fences and a further tightening of the legal ways to 
enter the EU, after which the vicious circle starts again. The only two parties that 
gain from this circle are security businesses to whom the control is increasingly 
contracted out and political extreme-nationalists. With regard to the latter, Claire 
Rodier (2012) recently has critically investigated the role played by this 
"commercial securitization industry", who contrary to political border control, does 
not democratically justify their actions and mechanisms, in the maintenance and 
consolidation of policies of (im)mobility which are expensive and ineffective. 
Rodier (2012:11) argues that "instead of providing the promised security, the main 
utility of each new border control device that is launched is to reveal the failures 
and shortcomings of the foregoing, and its primary purpose is to justify the need of 
those devices to come in the future11." Global inequality consolidates and 
irregularized migration flows toward and across EU's borders persists. This, 
without doubt, is a gold mine for those who sell the illusion of a perfect sealing-off 
in times of globalization. And also, no doubt, to those who buy it in order to 
display it in the public square and collect some votes. 
It is striking to see that, despite the many years of heavy investments in new 
border walls and controls, and despite a growing critique from academics, the EU 
still seems not to realise that higher walls have a counterproductive effect, nor does 
it want to take any legal responsibility neither for its discriminatory admission 
policy nor for the dying of people at its doorsteps (Spijkerboer, 2007). And there is 
no sign of moving in a different direction. In the present scenario, the centre of 
political and media attention is almost exclusively focused on EU’s own financial 
debt. There seems to be almost no room for the moral bankruptcy of a border 
regime that has for years now proven to be harmful and lethal. What is more, at the 
moment, while EUROSUR, the “pan-European border surveillance system” 
(http://www.frontex.europa.eu/eurosur) is about to be born, there is even talk of the 
use of drones in the tracking and tracing of those who wish to flee from political 
prosecution or economic poverty to the EU (see:   
http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/2133/the-eu-wants-to-protect-
schengen-with-drones). 
                                                
11 Translated by the authors 
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Growing protest 
In the meantime, the protest from outside academia is growing. Let us 
highlight here two examples, outside mainstream politics, that demonstrate how the 
EU border regime is increasingly being contested by a rapidly growing network of 
observers and protestors. Various organizations in countries like Tunisia, Italy, 
Germany, Morocco, France, Mali, Spain or the Netherlands, often consisting of a 
mix of researchers, journalists and activists, are increasingly finding each other on 
the Internet and in self-organized protest camps (e.g. noborder.org).  These 
encounters are fertile ground for the exploration of “phalansterian” spaces and 
practices (see Kramsch, 2012).  
In this light, in July 2012, coinciding with the international preparatory 
meeting of the World Social Forum Tunisia 2013, a symbolic flotilla of small boats 
crossed the Mediterranean and in an attempt to “occupy”’ the sea. During the 
trajectory traced by the "Boats 4 People" project12  – Palermo, Tunis, Monastir, 
Lampedusa – the travellers cried out against the discriminatory border regime of 
the EU.   
In a similar vein, and also supported by a network of civil society 
organizations, researchers and individuals, the Frontexit Campaign was launched in 
March 2013. It is led by 21 associations, researchers and individuals from both 
North and South of the Mediterranean (Belgium, Cameroon, France, Italy, Mali, 
Morocco, Mauritania, international organisations, regional networks). The 
campaign has a twofold objective: to inform a wide audience about the impacts 
of Frontex operations in terms of human rights, and to denounce these impacts to 
the political representatives who are directly involved. More concretely, through 
actions of investigation, litigation, awareness-raising and advocacy, this campaign 
aims to obtain: transparency surrounding mandates, responsibilities and actions of 
Frontex ; the suspension of Frontex  activities  violating human rights; the 
cancellation of regulations creating Frontex  if it is proven that the agency’s 
mandate is incompatible with respect of fundamental rights (see 
www.frontexit.org). 
Us against Us 
Reports like that of Strik, the critical voices in academia, the growing protests 
among NGO’s like Amnesty and No Borders, together form an impressive list of 
criticisms on the politics of collateral damage of the EU. The strengthening and 
fertilization of new “phalansterian” spaces which enable to fruitfully work through 
the border theory/activism divide (explored in a recent ACME special issue, see 
Kramsch, 2012) constitutes a useful step in this direction. But at the same time, it is 
unlikely that these voices will change the politics any time soon. The reason is not 
                                                
12 http://www.boats4people.org/index.php/en/ (accessed 11/04/2012) 
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so much that they are morally wrong, or that their message is not heard enough. 
The message is heard all right and the appeal for a more just border regime is 
morally convincing, as we have demonstrated earlier (Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 
2009). However, what the messengers face in changing the politics is the worst 
enemies of change: indifference. The message is largely ignored. A considerable 
part of the population is fearing the consequences of a more just border regime. 
And so the collateral damage politics of the EU is not contested but supported 
implicitly. It is a not-so-collateral damage politics. What is worse, the xenophobic 
electorate is not decreasing in numbers in Europe, but rising. The border closure 
politics is built on an increasing electoral thrust. And so the criticasters are 
increasingly fighting on the wrong battlefield. Yes, the EU is responsible. But the 
EU is not like an Orwellian ministry, but rather like a brave new world, a favourite 
enemy but one that in the case of border politics is executing a policy that is in fact 
desired and silently approved of by a growing electorate. So the real battle that 
needs to be won is not against the acclaimed them of the EU and Frontex, but 
against the other us. For the period ahead, in changing the not so collateral damage 
politics of deadly EU border control it is not us against them, but us against us.  
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